Labor Markets and School-to-Work Transition in Egypt: Diagnostics, Constraints, and Policy Framework by Angel-Urdinola, Diego F. & Semlali, Amina
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Labor Markets and School-to-Work
Transition in Egypt: Diagnostics,
Constraints, and Policy Framework
Diego F. Angel-Urdinola and Amina Semlali
World Bank
August 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27674/
MPRA Paper No. 27674, posted 27. December 2010 11:04 UTC
1 
 
Labor Markets and School-to-Work Transition in Egypt: 
Diagnostics, Constraints, and Policy Framework 
Diego Angel-Urdinola and Amina Semlali 1 
August 2010 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Analysis in this policy note indicates a rapid deterioration in employment opportunities for 
young individuals transitioning from school to work in Egypt. Despite substantial improvements 
in labor market outcomes in recent years (in raising employment and participation and in 
lowering unemployment), unemployment rates in Egypt remain exceedingly high among youth  
entering the labor market for the first time. A slow school-to-work transition remains the main 
reason behind high unemployment rates. Young entrants to the labor market have become 
more educated than ever before: the share of the working-age-population with university 
education in Egypt has increased significantly between the years 1998 and 2006 (from 14% to 
19% among men and from 9% to 14% among women). However, youth are unable to capitalize 
the time and resources invested in their education as the labor market is not providing enough 
good-quality jobs for them. To cope with scarce formal jobs, young-educated workers are opting 
to work in the informal sector and/or withdraw from the labor force, which is contributing to a 
deadweight loss of recent investments in education.  There are three key factors that seem to 
explain why school-to-job transition remains low in Egypt:  investments in the private sector 
remain low and capital intensive, new graduates are not equipped with the skills demanded by 
the private sector, and the public sector still provides incentives for educated individuals (mainly 
women) to queue for private sector jobs. There are several policy options used in the 
international context to further enhance the performance of the labor market; such as removing 
obstacles in regulation, enhancing employability of new entrants, reforming the civil service, and 
designing targeted programs aiming to boost labor demand. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite substantial progress in labor market outcomes in recent years (higher rates of 
employment and participation and lower rates of unemployment), quality of employment in 
Egypt has suffered an important deterioration, especially among youth entering the labor 
market. Young entrants to the labor force have become more educated than ever before but are 
unable to capitalize the time and resources invested in their education as the labor market is not 
providing enough good quality jobs for them. There is stagnation in the creation of good private 
sector jobs and the growth of public sector employment (a traditional source of employment for 
highly-qualified workers) is not enough to absorb all new entrants in to the labor market. 
Furthermore, new graduates do not possess the set of skills in demand in today’s labor market.  
Employers often consider young workers unattractive for employment because they lack the 
skills and experience necessary to fill available vacancies. The education and training systems 
are often unrelated to the job market demands, resulting in inadequate curricula that seems 
unaligned to the competencies required by employers. To cope with scarce formal jobs, young-
educated workers are opting to work in the informal sector (in low-quality/low pay jobs) and to 
withdraw from the labor force. These combine phenomena contributes to a deadweight loss of 
recent public and private investments in education. 
Egypt is not the only developing country facing these challenges. As such, the main objective of 
this policy note is twofold. First, it discusses existing empirical evidence to identify the main 
constraints to employability in Egypt. Next, it reviews examples of successful reforms, policy 
options, and programs that have been designed and implemented in other developing 
economies and which have proven to improve employability for new entrants to the labor 
market. While the note develops and discusses a general policy framework to promote 
employability, it does not aim at this stage to provide any specific policy recommendations. The 
note is structured as follows: Section I presents some facts about the school-to-work transition 
in Egypt using available micro data; Section II identifies two important constraints to youth 
employability; Section III discusses policy options available to facilitate the school-to-work 
transition. A brief conclusion follows. 
I. SCHOOL TO WORK TRANSITION IN EGYPT 
Despite positive job creation, labor market outcomes remain very stagnant for new entrants 
to the labor market (mainly youth and women). Despite moderate growth in GDP (averaging 
4.5 % per year in the period of study), between the years 1998 and 2006 labor market indicators 
in Egypt displayed significant improvement. Labor force participation rates rose from 48.4 to 
53.1% of the working-age population (15-64); unemployment rates decreased from 13.8 to 9.6% 
of the labor force; and the overall employment rate in the country rose from 42 to 48 % of the 
working-age population. Still, Egypt displays lagging employment indicators (higher levels of 
unemployment and lower levels of participation/employment) among youth and women.  
Unemployment rates remain very high among youth and women, and especially among those 
with higher levels of education. Unemployment rates among young women are much higher 
than among young among men, reaching up to 50% (vs. 17 to 18% among young men) (Figure 
1). Unemployment rates are highest among skilled youth, as they generally queue for public 
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sector jobs (Table 1) while unemployment rates among low-skilled youth are rather low as they 
rapidly absorbed in informal sector jobs (Assaad, 2008, 2009).2 
 
Figure 1: Unemployment rates by age and gender [Egypt, 2006] 
 
Source: World Bank using the 2006 Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) survey. 
 
Table 1: Unemployment rates by education and gender [Egypt, 2006] 
 Unemployment  
rates in %  
Men 
% Share of 
Unemployed 
Unemployment  
rates in % 
Women 
% Share of 
Unemployed 
Primary or below 1.71 13.06 1.77 2.98 
Preparatory/Sec. General 3.32 4.58 8.92 1.15 
Secondary Vocational 7.11 48.94 36.76 65.84 
Tertiary 10.52 33.42 29.11 30.03 
Source: World Bank using the 1998 and 2006 ELMPS survey.   
 
Slow school-to-work transition remains the main reason behind high unemployment rates. In 
Egypt, it takes about 7 years for youth to transition from school to work, as measured by the 
time it takes from when 50 percent of the population is enrolled in school to when 50 percent of 
the population is employed (Figure 2). In developed countries, it takes an average of about 1.4 
years for new young entrants to get a stable job. Individuals 15 to 29 years old account for more 
than one-quarter of the total population of Egypt and for about 22 per cent of the total Egyptian 
labor force. Young people also account for the largest segment of all the unemployed Egyptians: 
8 out of every 10 unemployed in Egypt are youngsters entering the labor market for the first 
time (Assaad, 2008, 2009). This group of young individuals is more educated than ever before. 
The share of the working-age-population with university education in Egypt has increased 
significantly (from 14% to 19% among men and from 9% to 14% among women) between the 
years 1998 and 2006. At the same time, Egypt’s former policy to guarantee public employment 
for university graduates has been suspended, which has contributed to slowing the growth of 
the public sector and has in particular affected new female graduates (who generally aim to find 
public sector jobs).  As a consequence, many school graduates, especially women, become 
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 Egypt displays lagging employment indicators (higher levels of unemployment and lower levels of 
participation and employment) compared to developing countries in East Asia and Latin America and to 
developed countries. This is especially true among women, who display very high (unemployment (low 
participation) rates in the international context. 
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jobless after graduation. According to ILO (2007), 5 out of every 10 new young entrants remain 
unemployed for many months after having graduated from school. 3 
 
Figure 2: School-to-work transition among Youth [Egypt 2006] 
 
Source: World Bank using the 2006 Egypt ELMPS survey 
 
To cope with scarce formal jobs, young-educated workers are opting to work in the informal 
sector and/or withdraw from the labor force. One of the main changes in the Egypt’s labor 
market between the years 1998 and 2006 was the rapid raise of informal employment as a 
share of total employment. This phenomenon is robust to several frequently used measures to 
quantify the levels of informality in labor markets (see Table 2). Informality, as measured by 
share of workers not contributing to social security (i.e. without access to pension and health 
insurance coverage through their employers) increased nationally from 49% to 58% in the 
period of study. Although the informality levels remain lower in urban areas than in rural areas, 
which is not surprising given the weight of the agriculture sector in rural areas, urban informality 
grew faster reaching 43% of the overall labor market.  
 
Table 2: Informality trends in Egypt  
 Workers not contributing to 
social security as % of total 
employment; 
Workers without a contract 
as % of total employment  
Share of workers in firms 
with less than 5 employees 
 Total 
1998 49.0 56.0 40.0 
2006 58.3 62.8 52.6 
% change 19.0 7.6 12.1 
 Urban 
1998 33.6 44.4 32.2 
2006 42.6 48.8 44.0 
% change 26.8 12.8 9.9 
 Rural 
1998 62.4 66.1 45.6 
2006 70.0 73.4 56.1 
% change 12.2 4.1 11.0 
Source: World Bank using the 1998 and 2006 ELMPS survey.     
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The increase in informality has deeply affected young entrants with higher levels of education. 
While informality remains lower among more educated workers, it is increasing much faster 
among this group (Figure 3, left panel). While in 1998 only a minority (less than 10%) of all 
workers with more than 17 years of education worked in the informal sector, by year 2006 the 
same share had raised between 20 and 30%. It is worth noting that acquiring informal jobs is a 
way for young/educated university graduates to enter the labor market, gain experience, and 
eventually move into formal employment as informality decreases quickly with age (however, 
women are less likely than men to transition from informal into formal sector jobs) (World Bank. 
2010)(Figure 3, right panel). The increase of educated workers within the informal sector is an 
outcome of both choice but mainly because of the increased supply of informal jobs. Yet, the 
raise in informality among highly educated individuals is not exclusive among youngsters. 
Indeed, informality rates are on the raise among the highly educated adult population as well. 
Moreover, as illustrated in Table 3, labor force participation among more educated women has 
decreased noticeably between the years 1998 and 2006, suggesting that many qualified women 
are withdrawing from the labor force due to lack of formal jobs. Marriage is also an important 
determinant explaining why educated women withdraw from the labor force. Educated women 
employed in the private sector (which is largely informal) are more likely to exit the labor force 
after marriage than women with government jobs. This occurs because the growing private 
sector generally does not provide a “family friendly” environment as compared to the public 
sector (e.g. maternity leaves, flexible schedules, daycare facilities, etc) (see World Bank, 2010).  
 
Figure 3: Informality by age-group and years of attained education 
 
 
Source: World Bank using the 1998 and 2006 ELMPS survey. 
 
Table 3: Female Labor Force Participation by Education Attainment 
Education Attained 1998 2006 
Vocational Secondary 3-Yr 57.45 39.50 
Vocational Secondary 5-Yr 61.52 69.06 
College 79.40 49.04 
University 72.50 60.72 
Source: World Bank using the 1998 and 2006 ELMPS survey. 
 
A large share of all jobs created between 1998 and 2006 for university graduates were 
“informal” (low quality/low pay) private sector jobs.  The private sector was the main engine 
for the creation of new jobs in Egypt between the years 1998 and 2006. Estimates from the 
ELMPS data (limiting the sample to urban areas only) indicate a net creation of more than 2 
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million jobs in Egypt in the period of study. The majority of these new jobs (about 62 %) were 
informal (low/quality low/pay) private-sector jobs (Figure 4). The private and public sectors 
managed to create only about 583 thousand new formal jobs, most of which were filled by 
workers with secondary vocational and tertiary education. Note that the majority of all new 
formal jobs (about 360 thousand) were created in the private sector. Nevertheless, even among 
highly educated workers, the majority of all net employment creation occurred in the informal 
sector. Among workers with primary and/or secondary general education, all net job creation 
was in the form of informal jobs. Among this group of less skilled workers, there was actually 
some net job destruction of about 130 thousand formal jobs. 4 
 
Figure 4: Net Job Creation between years 1998 and 2006 [Urban Egypt] 
 
Source: World Bank using the 1998 and 2006 ELMPS survey.   
 
Having to rely on informal sector jobs constitutes an important loss of human capital for 
young entrants. Returns to education (even among those with university education) are very 
low in the informal sector. Informal jobs are generally associated with low-wages, suggesting 
low levels of productivity as compared to the formal sector. Indeed, net hourly wages among 
informal workers in the private sector are quite low. For instance, a worker in the informal 
sector who has completed 5 years of education (equivalent to primary education) earns similar 
wage-rates to those of a worker who has attained 12 to 14 years of education (equivalent to 
complete secondary and some post secondary education). On the contrary, returns to 
investments in secondary and tertiary education (as well as returns to work experience) are 
quite significant in the formal sector as well as in the public sector. For instance, a formal worker 
with 12 and 16 years of education (equivalent to complete secondary and tertiary education 
respectively) would earn wages-rates that are twice to three times larger than those earned by a 
formal worker with 5 years of education (equivalent to primary education) (Figure 5). 5 
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 Informality is proxied by the share of overall employment not making social security contributions (i.e. 
without access to pension and health insurance coverage through their employers). 
5
 It is likely that there are unobserved factors that explain the difference of returns in the formal/informal 
that have to do with the selection into form/inform employment, which is not random. For instance,  
personal connections, networking, and other unobserved heterogeneity (such as effort and ability) may 
influence formal/informal wage differentials.  
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Figure 5: Net wages and returns to education – formal vs. informal workers  
 
Source: World Bank using the 1998 and 2006 ELMPS survey.  Sample: urban wage earners working 
between 30 and 60 hours per week.  
 
Most of the net job creation between the years 1998 and 2006 occurred in the wholesale, 
construction, and service sectors (mainly hotels and restaurants). Over the past 10 years, Egypt has 
progressed substantially in strengthening its investment climate. Tariffs and corporate tax rates 
tumbled, while customs and tax administration improved. The financial sector has been undergoing 
reforms as well. The Government took steps to reduce its ownership in the banking system; 
restructuring banks and non-bank institutions, and strengthening the regulatory framework for 
sound and competitive financial services. Private businesses also acknowledge that the Government 
has become more sympathetic to business and more open to the input of the business community 
on several key initiatives (ICA, 2008). As such, there has been an important dynamism in the private 
sector as the main engine of net job creation.  
 
The large majority of the net employment creation occurred in the informal–private sector. Figure 
6 illustrated the net job creation in urban Egypt by economic sector. Results indicate that a large 
share of all net employment creation between the years 1998 and 2006 (about 1.3 million new jobs) 
occurred in the construction, transport and communications, and wholesale and service sectors 
(mainly hotels and restaurants). Note that the manufacturing and agriculture sectors were also 
important engines of net employment creation: about 350 thousand new jobs were created in these 
two sectors between the years 1998 and 2006, the majority of which were informal sector jobs. 
Results also indicate that net “formal” employment creation occurred largely in social services 
(education and health); public administration; financial services and real estate; and wholesale, 
hotels, and restaurants.  
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Figure 6: Net Employment Creation by Sector [Urban Egypt 1998-2006] 
 
Source: World Bank using the 1998 and 2006 ELMPS survey.   
 
II. WHAT ARE THE MAIN CONSTRAINTS PREVENTING NEW ENTRANTS TO GET JOBS?  
a. Sluggish Investments in the Private Sector 
 
Despite great achievements in promoting a better business climate; private investment in 
Egypt remains low by international standards. Egypt‘s tax and regulatory improvements are 
one of its greatest success stories (World Bank, 2009). It is well known that Egypt has ranked 
among the top ten reformers measured by the Doing Business Indicators of regulatory burden in 
three of the last four years. There has been steady progress in reducing the burden of taxes and 
substantial improvement in tax administration. Business registry was streamlined through one-
stop shops making procedures clear, simpler, easier to comply with, and less subject to 
discretionary enforcement. Additional reforms were introduced in such areas as simplifying 
property registration, establishing a private credit bureau, activating a competition authority, 
and streamlining building regulations. Despite all this progress, private investment remains 
lagging in Egypt in the international context as indicated in Figure 7. Due to high energy 
subsidies and negative real interest rates, most private investments in Egypt seem to be 
channeled through capital (not labor) intensive activities. There are major constraints that 
prevent employment and investment from growing faster:  
 
• Macroeconomic stability: The perceptions of uncertainty deter investments. Macro-
economic instability is the number one constraint to business climate according to 
employers’ opinion in the 2008 Investment Climate Assessment (ICA). Employers perceive 
that growth has notably slowed due to the financial crisis and by a contraction of revenues 
from the Suez Canal, tourism and exports. Employers feel that unemployment is edging 
upward as well as inflation (World Bank, 2009). 
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• Unfair competition: Informal competition relate to the existence of informal operators 
who can undercut formal firms’ costs by evading tax, labor, public health and safety, and 
trade regulations. Also some formal operators hide a portion of their activity in the 
shadow by evading some portion of their tax, labor or trade obligations or other rules. 
Employers acknowledge the existence of several competitors who package inferior goods 
under international brand names or otherwise violate trademarks, patents or copyrights. 
Finally, employers feel that competition is constrained by dominant firms or by unfairly 
advantaged and/or connected individuals. Egypt has in recent years introduced a 
competition law and competition authority. In spite of a number of pending enforcement 
actions, it cannot be said that the enforcement of competition policy is yet systematic and 
broadly effective (World Bank, 2009, 2009A). 
 
• Corruption: Corruption remains common in obtaining approvals and connections. 51% of 
all manufacturing firms interviewed in the ICA 2008 report that in order to obtain their 
municipally granted permits they were required to present an official with an informal 
payment or gift, and nearly 40% of construction permits were obtained through a bribe of 
some sort.. Delays, high cost or uncertainty associated with service connections and 
administrative approvals can pose critical constraints to entry and new investment.   
 
Figure 7: Private Investments as % of GDP (Egypt in the international context) 
 
Source: processed from World Bank (2009) 
 
b. Skills Mismatches6 
 
Egyptian employers face difficulties recruiting qualified workers.  For the first time, results 
from enterprise surveys in Egypt (ICA 2008) indicate that firms identify worker skills and 
education among their top five constraints to business climate. In the MENA context, skills 
mismatches are particularly identified as a constraint to business development in Egypt (50% of 
all firms interviewed), followed by Lebanon (38%), Algeria (37%), Jordan (33%), and Morocco 
                                                 
6 It is important to note that in addition to skills mismatches there might also be a deficiency in the actual 
quality of education provided, as indicated by the rather poor performance of Egyptian youth on 
standardized international tests. For example, Egyptian students were ranked at the bottom place of 36 
out of 47 participating countries in science and they were ranked at place 37 out of 47 in mathematics. 
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(31%).  Manufacturing employers are demanding an ever more skilled workforce, and the supply 
is a constraint (World Bank 2009).  Enterprises are often staffed with under-qualified workers, 
who often lack practical experience. This occurs partly because the education system in Egypt 
has not traditionally been closely linked to policies promoting employment, economic growth, 
competitiveness, or technological development (ILO, 2007). Upper secondary education and 
higher education are heavily oriented towards academic university degrees, while programs 
oriented towards the skills that are most demanded in the labor market still play a marginal role. 
More than 70% of students in higher education are in humanities and social sciences. This 
pattern of enrollment is suited for absorbing university graduates in civil services jobs in the 
public sector, but appears ill suited for national development strategies that draw increasingly 
on private initiatives and on the expansion of the manufacturing and service sectors.  
 
Employers often find the lack of appropriate skills and experience a hurdle when considering 
hiring especially young workers. Indeed, according to ILO (2007), experience is the main factor 
employers take into account when hiring an employee. In addition, employers not only express 
their dissatisfaction concerning deficiencies in technical/occupation specific skills but also 
concerning more generic/soft skills sets. Soft skills refer to the cluster of personality traits, social 
graces, interpersonal skills, language and personal habits that characterize relationships with 
other people. It also refers to a person’s ability to think creatively and independently (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Young applicants’ skills assessment by employers 
 
Skill 
Very Good Fair Poor 
 
Required technical skills 18.2 50.5 31.3 
Practical training at school 10.1 42.4 47.5 
Communication skills 38.6 49.4 12.0 
Writing skills 39.2 41.0 19.8 
Ability to apply knowledge learned at school 22.4 37.0 40.6 
Commitment and discipline 62.9 28.9 8.2 
Overall preparedness 13.5 66.1 20.5 
Source: ILO (2007) 
 
Furthermore, the Vocational Training System is facing numerous challenges. New entrants to 
the job market are often rejected by employers and often become discouraged from seeking 
work for which they have been inadequately prepared. Ideally, technical and vocational 
education and training (TVET) could be an alternative for young entrants to enhance their skills 
and make them more employable. In practice, despite important efforts in recent years (Box 1), 
the TVET system largely fails to achieve this objective. There are several reasons why this is the 
case:  
 
• The TVET system is largely fragmented: There are 1,237 vocational training centers in 
Egypt, affiliated to 27 ministries or authorities, which operate somewhat independently in 
19 governorates. The Ministry of Education administers around 1,600 technical and 
vocational schools while the Ministry of Higher Education manages 47 middle technical 
institutes. Additionally, six other ministries run 232 vocational education training centers 
(Figure 8). Vocational education and training suffers from a lack of coordination due to the 
large number of agencies involved in regulating and providing programs. Furthermore, 
there is little coordination between training programs and the needs of the labor market: 
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curricula are outdated and are not reviewed frequently, and many training centers 
provide predesigned training courses which do not necessarily meet the needs of industry 
and the private sector. Moreover, monitoring and evaluation of the effects of training 
programs on labor market outcomes of participants is deficient (or non-existent).  
 
• Services are often supply-driven: Ministries in Egypt allocate their vocational training 
budgets to their providers on an ad-hoc basis not necessarily based on performance (ILO, 
2007). Training programs fail to adjust to the type and quality of skills that employers 
need. A survey conducted by the World Bank on 211 employers regarding the training 
system indicates that employers consider the training provided by the VTCs is deficient in 
quality and in market relevance. Employer federations representing small and medium 
enterprises have reported that the demand for semi-skilled workers and technicians is 
increasing rapidly, but that trained technicians and skilled workers are in short supply.  
 
 
Figure 8: Structure of the TVET system in Egypt 
 
Source: Kamel (2006) 
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Box 1: Recent TVET initiatives in Egypt 
 
Many initiatives have been conducted in order to improve the Egyptian TVET system. In 2000, the 
Education, training and Employment Sub-committee (ETES) report asked for reform. In 2002, the Egyptian 
government adopted a Policy statement on TVET. The Supreme Council on Human Resources 
Development (SCHRD) is responsible for the implementation of the reform. In 2000, a presidential decree 
re-established the SCHRD as a tripartite body. The SCHRD is chaired by the Ministry of Manpower and 
Emigration (MoME) and is composed by the relevant institutions for TVET (such as Ministry of Education, 
Ministry of Higher Education, Federations of Employers, and other representatives). The SCHRD has an 
Executive Committee and a Technical Secretariat. The presidential decree also created local Councils of 
Human Resource Development. The role of the SCHRD is “to set up a national policy related to planning 
and developing manpower and training and set up comprehensive and global national program for the 
development and optimum use thereof” (ETES report, 2000). In this perspective many programs are being 
developed: 
 
- The National Skills Standard and Certification Project  
- The creation of the National Training Fund  
- The World Bank Higher Education Enhancement project  
- Mubarak Kohl Initiative (MKI) 
- Skill Development Program of the World Bank 
- TVET project (European Commission) 
 
Source: ETF  (2007) 
 
• Low quality of training: The efficiency and quality of  training are low due to i) insufficient 
budget allocation and ii) the separation of theory from practice which should be the norm 
in VTCs providing pre-employment training. According to a CAPMAS survey, few 
instructors acquired an acceptable training: only 35% had any pedagogical training and 
only 50% had attended any advanced practical training (ILO, 2007). The VTCs suffer from a 
lack of knowledge about curriculum development methodologies and an inability to 
monitor, evaluate and modify curricula. In addition, the vast majority of equipment in 
training centers is in bad conditions (due to lack of maintenance) or depleted, and/or is 
underutilized. 
 
c. Public sector still distorts incentives 
 
Egypt’s civil service remains large for its levels of development. Egypt’s civil service is larger 
than all countries with similar levels of income and economic structure. Historically, the growth 
in the Egyptian civil service can be traced to the employment guarantee offered by the 
Government to university graduates and later extended to graduates of vocational secondary 
schools and training institutes in the 1970s and 80s. Despite the fact that the employment 
growth of the public sector has slowed dramatically in recent years and that Egypt’s former 
policy to guarantee employment for university graduates has been suspended since the early 
1990s, public sector employment (government and public enterprises) still accounts for about 
65% of all formal sector employment and for 45% of all new formal jobs created in the economy 
between the years 1998 and 2006 (about 260 thousand jobs) (Figure 9). As a legacy of this 
guarantee, in addition to overstaffing, the civil service has a serious skill-mix problem.  Nearly 
37% of government employees are vocational school graduates who were not necessarily hired 
on a needs basis. Moreover the guarantee itself resulted in an artificial demand for vocational 
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education, thereby channeling a very large section of the population into low skill/productivity 
jobs (Assaad 2008, 2009). Since public sector jobs are still associated with relatively generous 
medical and retirement benefits, relatively short work hours, and transportation benefits and on 
average, public sector real wages have stayed competitive with private-sector wages (although, 
civil servants' take-home pay is dominated by allowances that distort the incentive structure and 
create inequities) many educated individuals still queue for public sector jobs. This phenomenon 
undermines entrepreneurship among young educated workers and contributes to long 
unemployment spells. Moreover, public-sector jobs are highly attractive for women. The share 
of female employment in total government employment grew from about 15 percent in 1980 to 
about 30 percent by 1995 and has remained at approximately the same level ever since.  The 
slowdown in public-sector hiring has led to many women dropping out of the labor force 
entirely (Shaban 2010).  
 
Figure 9: Share of Formal Employment (Public vs. Private) 
 
Source: World Bank using the 1998 and 2006 ELMPS survey. 
 
III. WHAT POLICY OPTIONS FACILITATE SCHOOL-TO-WORK TRANSITION  
a. Making Labor Markets More Flexible and Improving Workers’ Income Protection 
 
Labor regulation and labor taxes, among other factors, seems to be introducing important 
restrictions to employability. Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) in Egypt remains 
particularly stringent in Egypt. Egypt enacted a new labor law in July 2003 that gave employers 
more flexibility to adjust the labor force to economic conditions. Among others, the law 
introduced fixed term contracts (that can be extended unlimitedly), relaxed hiring and dismissal 
laws, allowed workers the ability to strike, and introduced rules for collective bargaining and 
dispositions for settling worker-employer disputes (Assaad, 2008, 2009).7 Despite the reform, 
entrepreneurs feel that mandatory benefits and contributions as well as laws/regulations 
governing hiring and firing of workers continue to be important constraints to employment 
growth. According to World Bank (2009), manufacturing firms, service firms, and hotels report 
they would hire a net of 21%, 9%, and 15% more workers respectively if there were no 
restrictions to hiring and firing workers (Figure 10). 
 
                                                 
7
 The 2003 reform seems to have improved the flexibility of the labor market in an uneven manner: the 
reduction in the excessive protection of open-ended employment contracts happened at a cost of shifting 
most employment generation and destruction to fixed-term contracts as it became possible to renew 
fixed-term contracts for an unlimited number of times. 
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Figure 10: Net employment creation if firing/hiring restrictions were abolished in Egypt.  
 
Source: processed from World Bank (2009A) 
 
In particular, firing regulations remain strict and firing costs remain high for international and 
regional benchmarks, which tends to negatively affect employment creation, especially among 
youth and women (Almeida and Carneiro, 2006). While the termination of workers due to 
redundancy is legally authorized, firms face complex procedures that involve notification and 
consultation with the Ministry of Manpower and Migration for dismissals. Furthermore, the 
costs of dismissal of a redundant worker in Egypt are among the largest in the world. One 
indicator generally used to compare firing costs is the “Redundancy Cost Indicator” (RCI) (Angel-
Urdinola and Kuddo, 2010). The indicator measures the cost of advance notice requirements, 
severance payments and penalties due when terminating a redundant worker, expressed in 
weeks of salary. Results indicate that the RCI in Egypt accounts for 132 weeks of salary as 
compared an average of 50 in the MENA region, 53 in Latin America, 28 in Europe and Central 
Asia (ECA), and 27 among OECD countries (Figure 11).  
 
At the same time, labor taxes in Egypt are high for regional standards.  Labor Taxes and 
contributions in Egypt (equivalent to 25.6% of corporate profits) are high for international 
standards.8 High labor taxes discourage labor demand by raising labor costs to employers and 
labor supply by lowering the real consumption wage of workers (Rutkowski, 2007).  They create 
a “tax wedge” between labor cost to the employer and the worker’s take-home pay, which is 
tantamount/equivalent to a negative shift in labor demand. Also, higher labor taxes – under 
some circumstances – could also lead to a slowdown in economic growth (Daveri and Tabellini, 
2000).  
 
                                                 
8
 Social contributions constitute a significant share of labor taxes in Egypt. The pension system have been 
managed on a pay-as-you-go basis and financed by a 25%  contribution rate – the highest in the region 
(World Bank, 2007). The 2010 reform of the pension system was recently submitted to parliament 
proposing an important decrease in social contributions. The effects of the reform in labor demand, 
however, have been un-assessed. This reform constitutes an important step in reducing labor taxes. For 
more details see World Bank (2009a).  
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Figure 11: Redundancy Cost Indicator [In Weeks of Salary]
 
Source: Angel-Urdinola and Kuddo (2010) 
 
The reform of labor regulation should go hand in hand with the introduction of appropriate 
social protection measures. Because of current limited social insurance coverage, income 
protection policies in Egypt are based to a large extent on the regulation of dismissal procedures 
and severance pay. Egypt has an unemployment insurance scheme. Employees enrolled in the 
mandatory social insurance scheme have access to unemployment insurance benefits offering 
60% of the prior to lay-off wages for a period up to 7 months spent with job search. A 2% payroll 
tax is imposed on wages in association with the UI scheme.  In effect, this mechanism hardly 
exists; during the period 2001-07 in average 330 people received benefits. The factors 
contributing to the low utilization are (i) a lack of public awareness about UI benefits among 
plan members, (ii) restrictive eligibility conditions, (iii) the difficulty of (and the stigma attached 
to) documenting a “just-cause” firing decision, and (iv) low overall lay-off risk among covered 
open-ended contract employees (World Bank, 2008). A recent reform of the of social insurance, 
which largely benefited from the World Bank’s technical advice, and which included a revision of 
UI scheme;  was submitted to parliament during the first semester of year 2010. The reform 
introduces unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISA), whereby employers deposit a 
specified fraction of the worker’s earnings in a special savings account on a regular basis. Upon 
separation workers can make withdrawals from their savings accounts as they deem fit. 
Unfortunately, the intended impact of expanding coverage after this reform may be undermined 
because the existing labor market regulations are extremely protective towards regular open-
ended jobs, which are also the group eligible to benefit from the new UI scheme. In general, a 
reform in UI systems should go hand-in-hand with a reform in employment protection 
legislation, especially in relation to dismissal laws and procedures.   
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b. Design Programs Targeted to Youth and Women – International Experiences 
 
Subsidies: 
 
In periods of healthy economic growth, subsidizing social security contributions for youth and 
women is a policy option to create new jobs. As part of a broad labor reform package approved 
by the parliament in Turkey aiming to reduce non-wage labor costs in the labor market, the 
Government of Turkey designed a subsidy for new youth and women hires between July 2008 
and June 2009 consisting of 100% of employers’ social security contributions (at the legal 
minimum wage) in the first year, with a 20 percentage points decline per year in the subsidy in 
the following four years. According to a program evaluation piloting a similar program in 
selected regions in Turkey between January 2004 and December 2005 (Betcherman, Daysal, and 
Pages, 2007), the growth rate in employment among youth and female workers in provinces 
that benefited from subsidies was 1.7% per month while in provinces that did not benefit from 
the subsidy displayed the growth rate was 1.1% per month (i.e. subsidies contributed to a 63% 
increase in the growth rate of employment in beneficiary provinces). Using this pilot experience 
to predict the impact of the program nationally, the program could have contributed to a net 
creation of approximately 163,000 to 235,000 new jobs (World Bank, 2010) (Figure 12). 
Unfortunately, Turkey was hardly hit by the financial crisis, undermining the impact of the 
program. Programs like this, while attractive to promote employment among targeted groups, 
could be expensive. Estimates from the Turkish Treasury indicate that generating one extra job 
for those benefiting from the program could cost between 12 and 17 thousand US dollars. 
 
Figure 12: Employment Effects of Targeted Subsidies to Social Contributions in Turkey 
[Estimates, July 2008-June 2009] 
 
Source: World Bank (2008) 
 
While wage subsidies have the potential to be advantageous for certain groups, if treated as a 
temporary measure, unintended macroeconomic side-effects question their longer term 
usefulness. Available evidence suggests that wage subsidies work to the advantage of women 
and young individuals, especially for those from disadvantaged backgrounds (Galasso et al. 
2002; Betcherman et al. 2007), and that they are particularly effective when combined with 
other programs, such as on-the-job training, counseling, and job search assistance (Kluve 2006). 
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Wage subsidies seem cost-effective in countries such as Poland and Argentina (Cunningham et 
al. 2010). However, unintended macroeconomic side-effects of wage (and employment) 
subsidies include deadweight loss (hiring from the target group that would have occurred also in 
the absence of the program), substitution effects (the extent to which jobs created for the 
target groups replaces jobs for other groups), and displacement effects (the possible reduction 
of jobs elsewhere in the market) (Calmfors 1994).  
 
Youth Programs: 
 
Comprehensive training programs targeted to youth (16-29) through public-private 
partnerships have proven successful to increase employability. In recent years, Egypt has 
initiated important efforts to design and implement labor market program targeted to youth 
and women (Box 2)9. Most of these programs focus on in-class training (hard skills). Only a few 
provide some type of practical experience, focus on soft-skills, and/or provide some type of 
employment services and/or labor market intermediation (Angel-Urdinola, Semlali, Brodmann, 
2010). Many countries, particularly in the OECD and Latin America, have moved from in-
classroom towards a more comprehensive training model which includes the provision of in-
classroom and workplace training plus supplementary services such as counseling and 
mentoring, monitoring, job search and placement assistance, and soft and life skills training.   
Youth unemployment rates soared in many Latin American economies during the late 1990s as a 
consequence of the Tequila and Argentina crisis. To address this issue, the Chilean government 
designed what is known as “Chile Joven” program. The program basically offered comprehensive 
“demand-driven” training programs to unemployed youth between 16 and 29 years of age. The 
program was so successful that similar models were customized throughout Argentina, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, and Republica Bolivariana de 
Venezuela. Depending on the specific needs identified the programs can be targeted to either 
the general unemployed youth population, or to specific marginalized groups such as school 
drop-outs.  
 
• Public-Private partnerships: training programs are directly linked to an internship with a 
private employer previously identified by the training institution. To achieve this, 
training providers (contracted through public mechanisms) must assure practical 
experience for the trainee, which create incentives for the training provider to not only 
train beneficiaries, but also serve as intermediaries between them and the private 
sector.  
 
• Training provides hard and soft skills: the program provides youth not only with 
technical skills, but also with life skills. Some programs, like Juventud y Empleo in 
Dominican Republic, integrate life skills education to help young people be more 
effective employees and citizens. Among the topics taught are self-esteem, teamwork, 
communication skills, work organization and service skills, job search skills, and 
knowledge related to risky behaviors (reproductive health, drug use, violence, etc.). 
Similar life skills modules are also integrated into the second chance education program. 
 
                                                 
9
 For a detailed inventory of Active Labor Market Programs in Egypt, see Angel-Urdinola, Semlali, 
Brodmann, 2010 
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• Training provides practical experience: As mentioned above, in order to ensure the 
demand-driven nature of the training, training providers are required to identify 
internships with local employers. They subsequently design/adjust the content of the 
technical training based on the specific needs of the employer. As such, the willingness 
of employers to take on interns (and in some cases vacancies) serves as a proxy for 
employer demand in that field. The internships last for about 8–12 weeks, during which 
staff from the training providers accompany and monitor participants. 
 
• Flexibility: some youth generally contribute to the household income and/or take care 
of their children during regular hours of business or school. For this reason classes are 
held at nights and on weekends and offer different schedule alternatives. In order to 
ensure commitment of the trainee, some of these youth programs charge a 
minimal/affordable fee when students enroll. 
 
• Monitoring and Evaluation: most of the programs rely of experimental techniques to 
monitor the impact of the training program on participant labor market outcomes. 
Carefully designed impact evaluations in Argentina, Chile, and Dominican Republic 
indicate that youth who participate in the program display a 10 to 21 % higher likelihood 
to find employment than otherwise similar youth who do not attend the program. 
Furthermore, evaluations indicate that earnings among those who find employment 
after having participated in the program are 10 to 21 % larger than among those who 
find employment but did not participate in the program (Table 6) (World Development 
Report, 2007)    
 
Box 2. Two Examples of Policy Pilots Seeking to Improve Female and Youth Labor Market Outcomes 
 
- The Gender Equity Model Egypt (GEME): There is evidence that working conditions which are not ‘gender 
friendly’ are an implicit mobility barrier for working women in Egypt. Hence, encouraging firms to make 
their work environment more gender friendly is another potentially useful labor market program. In this 
context a small pilot project, the GEME, has been initiated under the World Bank’s Gender Action Plan to 
promote gender equity in private firms through engendering policies which facilitate equal access to jobs 
and opportunities for training and professional development within private firms. Participating firms 
undergo a certification program that audits their existing policies towards female employment, and draws 
up an action plan identifying areas to target.  
 
 - The Egypt Impact Evaluation of the Micro and Small Enterprise (MSE) Lending Project: Encouraging 
women to start their businesses and become employers rather job seekers has been recognized as a 
crucial strategy for improving women’s economic participation in Egypt. An important new initiative in 
order to better understand female and youth access to entrepreneurial financing and financing impact is 
the MSE Lending Project. The World Bank is providing a financial intermediary loan to the Government 
which is to be passed through to the Social Fund for Development to foster MSE growth. One important 
component of this program will be to use post office branches as loan outlets. Besides offering a standard 
microfinance loan product, which all microenterprise owners in the village will be eligible to apply for, it is 
proposed that the post office branches will have a product targeted at female household heads with the 
aim of providing them with productive employment opportunities.  
 
Source: World Bank Gender Assessment Egypt, 2010 
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Table 6: Cost and impact of youth training programs – some examples 
 Argentina 
Projecto Joven 
Chile 
Chile Joven 
Dominican Republic 
Juventud y Empleo 
Coverage (people) 116,000 165,000  
Cost per trainee (US$) 2,000 730 to 930  
Program’s Impact    
Employment (% point increase) 10 21 6 to 8 
Earnings (% point increase) 12 26 10 
Source: World Development Report (2007) and Vermehren et Al (2006) 
 
Early Childhood Development: 
 
Many young women could be encouraged to work by having access to affordable care for their 
children. Although the Egyptian Kindergarten program (targeting 4-5 year olds) has grown 
rapidly in the past decade, it covers only a fraction of the eligible population and poor children 
display very low enrollment rates. ECD programs targeting 0-3 year olds (through e.g. mother at-
home training) remains next to non-existent. Subsidizing childcare and preschool education has 
several externalities that positively affect the welfare of future generations. First, international 
evidence (MIT 2006) suggests that high-quality early childhood education and care helps 
prepare young children to succeed in school and eventually in life. This translates into economic 
returns because they are associated with lower repetition and dropout rates throughout a 
student’s lifetime. Second, and directly relevant for this Report, a developed child care 
education industry could be economically important because it creates jobs and allows parents 
(mainly young mothers) to be economically active.  Furthermore, international experiences have 
shown that investing in Early Childhood Development (ECD) and Early Childhood Education 
(ECD) benefits the overall economic competitiveness, creates job opportunities while offering 
significant return on public investment (Box 3) 
 
Box 3: Childcare Programs in Chile, and the US.  
 
“Chile Grows with You” (Chile Crece Contigo): 
The Government of Chile launched a social policy initiative in 2006 promoting full support for the 
country’s children as of their birth. Through it, boys and girls are protected from the moment of 
conception with relevant and timely services that allow for early stimulation and provide opportunities for 
their comprehensive development. Under the policy, Chilean children from the poorest families are 
eligible to attend daycare centers and preschools for free. The aim is to ensure that all children have 
access to primary health care, and that all the families receive tools to better support the growth of their 
children not only in terms of health and nutrition, but also psychological support. The program offers 
direct action to help the poorest 40% households. 
 
US Minnesota Childcare: 
Minnesota child care is generating more than 28,000 full-time jobs and $962 million in gross receipts 
annually. It is a significant job-creating, income-generating industry sector and is critical to the state’s 
economy. Minnesota child care contributes more in annual gross receipts than many other major 
recognized industries in the state (larger than wireless telecommunications -$795 million, business 
support services -$858 million, and the cattle industry -$944 million). It enables businesses to recruit 
employees, decrease absenteeism and turnover, increase productivity and - ensuring a strong economy 
also in the future - by preparing children for academic success. 
 
Source: Dolan (2006); and Traill et. Al (2003) 
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c. Modernization/reform the TVET System and improving the efficiency of employment 
services and active labor market policies 
 
There are basic ingredients to increase the viability and effectiveness of training programs: 
provision of comprehensive/integrated package of services; orientation to labor demand; 
linkages to real workplaces; careful targeting with adequate profiling of clientele; and 
monitoring and evaluation. This could be achieved by a realistic allocation of resources on cost-
effectiveness basis; through closer interactions with the private sector, by designing the right 
incentives (such as performance contracting with training providers); and building closer 
partnerships with employers and business communities. Modern TVET are generally built upon 
three main pillars:  
 
• Coordination among stakeholders: Clear mechanisms and institutional settings to 
coordinate between the public and private sector and between training providers and 
beneficiaries constitutes a key factor of success for the delivery of TVET services and 
programs. In Latin America, “Entra 21” provides a model whereby a central institution 
coordinates TVET programs serving as a link between the public and private sectors. 
Entra 21 was created in 2001 to improve the employability of youth in Latin America 
and the Caribbean by equipping them with the skills demanded by the labor market and 
securing employment for the graduates. The organization operates in 18 Latin American 
and Caribbean countries (35 projects) that seek to satisfy two different audiences: youth 
looking for work, and employers looking for qualified applicants for entry-level jobs. The 
International Youth Foundation (IYF), which is an international NGO, acts as the 
overarching umbrella organization: coordinating the efforts of NGO’s, the public and the 
private sector in the various countries. The program details vary from country to 
country; but the NGOs often work directly with the Municipal Government to identify 
the labor market needs and the youth’s skills deficit in order to bridge the skills 
mismatch.  
 
• Orientation towards job search assistance and intermediation: Together with demand-
driven training, job-search and recruitment services are important to bridge 
inefficiencies in the labor market related to frictional unemployment. There are several 
tools for achieving this purpose. One is to increase the capacity of public employment 
offices to offer job-search assistance, such as information about various opportunities in 
education and continued education, specialized job counseling, job placement, and 
professional orientation services. Indeed, job-search assistance programs are found to 
be the most cost-effective for youth in OECD countries (Quintini and Martin 2006; 
Betcherman et al 2007). Another successful tool is to design performance based 
contracts whereby training providers play a role as intermediaries between beneficiaries 
and the private sector. This entails that, inter alia, youth and TVET Graduate would have 
access to employment services after completion of their education/training as well as 
the possibility to access internships during the course of their study.  
 
• Performance monitoring: Information provides directives for adjustments and change. A 
critical need for a well functioning TVET system is to have a good Labor Market 
Information System used for performance monitoring (i.e. to assess program’s 
effectiveness against predetermined objectives). This would also provide youth with 
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information on actual needs of the labor market and encourage enrollment in vocations 
on the rise and vice versa. The value of performance management information is to help 
organizations and programs to clearly identify its objectives and best use its resources to 
achieve those objectives. Performance monitoring would also provide TVET institutions 
and trainers with directives towards a frequently revised set of specializations in 
demand, and allow for various relevant (including TVET) diplomas, courses and 
programs to follow suit with a dynamic revision of curricula to match market projections 
(locally and internationally, depending on the sector). Selecting appropriate and useful 
performance indicators requires careful thought about capturing program objectives 
while balancing the need for accurate and relevant information with simplicity and ease 
of data collection.   
 
• Information and choice: It is important to design TVET systems in which users have the 
capacity to choose technical careers in high demand as well as the training courses and 
training providers that better suit their professional interest, schedule, and preferences. 
Some countries, like Chile, Colombia, and the United States, provide students with 
training vouchers. Vouchers allow consumers to choose the type of goods or services 
and the provider that is best for them. Of course, vouchers systems require that 
availability and dissemination of information about providers and training courses is 
available. In Colombia, through a process of lottery assignment, students were given 
vouchers for vocational training (some redeemable in public training institutions and 
others in private training institutions). Results from a detailed impact evaluation of the 
program indicates that students who obtained private vouchers did much better (higher 
completion rates, and better employment outcomes after completion) due to more 
flexible curriculum and schedules available in private institutions.   
  
d. Reform of the public sector. 
 
While the public sector in Egypt are hiring smaller numbers of high school and university 
graduates, these jobs are still highly desired and may become more so at a time of economic 
insecurity. In the long run, the government should change their employment practices, to 
remove the distortion effects of public sector employment. To begin with, the Government 
Guarantee under the Law 85 of 1973 stands suspended but has not been abolished10. If the 
status of this guarantee were clarified there could be a significant reduction in queuing for 
Government jobs (Shaban 2010). The current entry level hiring is formula-based, which gives 
weight to the year of graduation, level of education, grades, etc. The system was initially 
designed to reduce the risks of favoritism in hiring; however, there is little proper evaluation of 
actual skills. The public sector could introduce merit-based pay and promotion measures that 
stress productivity, in turn sending better signals to young people, their parents and schools. 
Written exams and interviews (that evaluate personal traits, academic records, language 
abilities and functional numeracy) for prospective labor market entrants and judicious use of 
recommendation letters from teachers and employers would begin to direct government hiring 
away from current methods (Dhillon 2009). 
 
                                                 
10
   In some cases, such as in the case of graduates of the Institute of Tax Collectors (Ma’had Al Sayarefa), 
all who graduate are still guaranteed jobs in the Ministry of Finance. 
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In order to address public sector overstaffing voluntary retirement schemes need to be 
developed - in addition to continued attrition.  Roughly 30% of current government positions 
are redundant.11 Even if only half the slots falling vacant due to retirement over the next 10 
years are filled, the size of the public sector would be reduced by only about 10%.  Therefore if a 
further dent is to be made in the size, voluntary retirement schemes need to be developed. The 
experience gained in the Bank’s ongoing work with other governments (for example, Morocco 
and Yemen) to develop such schemes could be useful in Egypt (Shaban, 2010).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Labor market outcomes in Egypt remain very stagnant for new entrants to the labor market. 
Youth in Egypt displays higher levels of unemployment and lower levels of participation and 
employment. As a consequence, new entrants to the labor force – albeit more educated than 
ever – are unable to capitalize the time and resources invested in their education. There is 
stagnation in the creation of good private sector jobs, forcing young entrants to work in the 
informal sector and/or withdraw from the labor force. The main constraint preventing new 
entrants to get jobs relates to the stagnation of private investment coupled with skills 
mismatches. The education and training systems are often unrelated to the job market 
demands, resulting in inadequate curricula that seems unaligned to the competencies required 
by employers. There are several policy options that could facilitate school to work transition; 
such as making labor markets more flexible, enhancing employability of new entrants though 
well designed vocational training programs, increasing quality of education, public sector 
reform, and designing programs aiming to boost labor demand of new graduates. 
 
  
                                                 
11
 CAOA functional analysis carried out of various government departments. 
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